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Abstract  
Election forecasting is an expanding domain within political science, moving from the 
outer edges (as a novelty pursued by a few ‘quants’) toward the mainstream of the 
discipline.  Amongst the most high profile of election forecasting techniques are 
prediction markets and vote-intention polls.  While the weight of scholarly opinion 
appears to favour prediction markets over polls for election forecasting, there remain 
challengers and critics.    
This article joins with the challengers and the critics, looking at whether this ‘horse race’ 
competition between election forecasting approaches is valid.  Using data from the 2013 
Australian federal election, we conclude such comparisons-of-forecasts are misplaced in 
the Australian context, as prediction markets and vote-intention polls appear to be 
independent of each other given information from one appears to have no impact on the 
other. 
Introduction 
Election forecasting is an expanding domain within political science, moving from the 
outer edges (as a novelty pursued by a few political ‘quants’) toward the mainstream of 
the discipline (and of increasing interest to politicians, strategists and the allied media).  
The emergence of election forecasting competitions, looking at which forecaster and/or 
technique delivers the ‘best’ or the ‘better’ forecast, underscores the still open nature of 
the range of alternate approaches.  Amongst the most high profile of election forecasting 
techniques are prediction markets and vote-intention polls.  While the weight of scholarly 
opinion appears to favour prediction markets over polls for election forecasting, there 
remain challengers and critics.   This article joins with the challengers and the critics, 
looking at whether this ‘horse race’ competition between election forecasting approaches 
is valid, and whether one or other method adds any informational value to the other.  
Using data from the 2013 Australian federal election, we conclude such comparisons-of-
forecasts are misplaced in the Australian context, as prediction markets and vote-
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intention polls are addressing different questions, and they appear to be independent of 
each other given information from one appears to have no impact on the other. 
Prediction Markets 
Prediction markets – also known as ‘information markets’ or ‘events futures markets’ – 
have emerged as potential sources of market information, intelligence and as platforms 
for forecasting the occurrence and/or outcome of an event.   Such markets are analogous 
to the widely used futures markets in commodity and financial markets (Berg et al, 2003. 
Prediction markets have emerged in economics, in the form of the “Economic 
Derivatives” markets founded by Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs, covering the 
outcome of certain prominent macro-economic indicators; in entertainment, with the 
somewhat misnomered Hollywood Stock Exchange, which focused on film revenues and 
awards; various closed (intra-firm) markets for prescribed commercial events or 
outcomes (for example, Hewlett-Packard and sales of information technology products; 
and, Siemens on computer software) and, potentially most interestingly, the ‘terrorism 
futures’ market proposed, but quickly scuttled following political pressure, by the United 
States Department of Defence (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). 
However, prediction markets appear to have gained greatest traction in the political 
space, in particular regarding the outcome of elections, whether in presidential or 
congressional (most notably, the United States) or in Westminster systems (such as 
Australia).   The platforms range from the Iowa Electronic Markets pioneered (and 
operated) by the University of Iowa in the United States (covering, inter alia, United 
States presidential elections) to the markets made by professional betting agencies such as 
Sportsbet; Betfair and others for Australian Federal elections (covering, inter alia, which 
party will win the election, the number of seats the major players will win, and even 
individual wins won/lost; see, for example, Leigh and Wolfers, 2006). 
Prediction markets tend to be designed around a number of approaches, with market 
positions (ostensibly bets by the participants) paying off depending on either the 
outcome of a specific event (for example, Party A wins the election), the realisation of a 
continuous variable (Party B wins between 70 and 80 seats in the lower house in the 
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election) or with some combination of these two (Party A wins the election, with a 
majority of between 15 and 20 seats in the lower house).  In general terms, if the 
outcome bet upon occurs, then the ‘bet pays off’ at the odds on which it is placed (for 
example, a winning bet of $1 at 3-to-1 returns $4, being the original $1 plus the $3 
dividend).  For quantitative political scientists, the patterns of the bets placed, and the 
movements in the odds provide useful information on distribution of probabilities at 
different points in time, and across time, of the event(s) at hand occurring. 
Prediction markets come in a number of market designs, the most common of which are 
continuous double auction markets (both with and without market-makers), where each 
seller/buyer of a position is matched by a counterparty buyer/seller of the same position.   
For example, someone buying a market position of say 3:1 of Party A winning the 
election is countervailing  another person holding the opposing view (that is, they think 
the odds are 3:1 that Party A will not win the election).   Movements in these odds (and 
their implied probabilities) signal changing opinions within the relevant market (and even 
between markets, where spread-betting can be undertaken).  The odds ratio is essentially 
the mean price of buyers and sellers, while the spread of the bids/offers is indicative of 
the variance of beliefs of market participants.  
Other forms of prediction markets include pari-mutuel systems, where all the money bet 
by the participants is placed in a common pool which is then divided amongst the 
winners.   Pari-mutuels have particular application where it is not appropriate for 
counter-parties to bet against each other, but rather when the objective is to elicit the best 
forecast from a stable of participants (eg professional forecasters predicting, say, the 
inflation rate, the unemployment rate or some other defined economic indicator).  By 
comparison, market scoring-style prediction markets, which appear to have found favour 
in the business world as a means of extracting information from internal markets 
(essentially their own employees), focus on rewarding a single person for the accuracy of 
their forecast.  For example, a large firms creates an internal market designed to predict 
says the volume of sales of their product twelve months hence (measured as the number 
of units sold).    While the most accurate forecasts ‘wins the pool’, other participants are 
allowed to purchase the right for the reward when they think they have a better forecast; 
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the size of the winnings-pool often being subsidised by a market-maker (usually the 
employing corporation). 
Prediction markets are seen to have a number of important advantages both per se, and 
relative to opinion polling.  These advantages include: they tend to respond more 
effectively to new information (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2006; Rothschild, 2009; Snowberg 
et al 2012), given prediction markets are ‘open’ and functioning continuously (making 
them particularly useful for event impact analysis), compared to polls which are only 
taken occasionally and at certain points in time; they are consistent with the efficient 
markets hypothesis (that is, markets consolidate, and appropriately weight, all available 
information: Wolfers and Ztizewitz, 2006); they are resilient/less vulnerable to 
manipulation (Rhode and Stumpf, 2005); and, they are better forecasters of election 
outcomes than alternative mechanisms, most notably opinion polls (Leigh and Wolfers, 
2006; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006; Berg, Nelson and Rietz, 2007; Rothschild, 2009). 
 
However, prediction markets also have a number of disadvantages, which can introduce 
bias and/ or noise into their operation and signal-sending.   Amongst these disadvantages 
are: the tendency for some market participants to take positions based on their 
exogenous (to the market) existing biases or preference, for example relating to sporting 
identification (with a given team: Strumpf, 2004) or party identification (with a given 
political party: Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann and Wright, 1992; Forsythe, Reitz and Ross, 
1999); the potential to attract out-right gamblers whose driving motivation is to take 
‘risky positions’ in the market, and/or contrarians who gain some intangible utility from 
‘leaning against the wind’; and, their vulnerability to ‘favourite’ or ‘long-shot’ bias, where 
market participants tend to over-value very low probability events (‘extreme longshots’: 
Thaler and Ziemba, 1988; Erikson and Wlezien, 2008), which means prediction markets 
tend to perform poorly at forecasting such events, and/or a more likely in ‘thinner’ 
markets (that is, where there is a lower volume of transactions (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 
2004).   Participants in political prediction markets tend to far from representative of the 
overall population.  One United States study (Berg, Nelson and Rietz, 2007) found 
participants in political prediction markets where overwhelmingly young, white, educated 
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males with high family incomes, and potentially not even eligible to vote; far from 
representative of the socio-demographic profile of the American electorate or population. 
Prediction Markets and Polls 
Prediction markets are becoming increasingly prominent in election analysis and 
forecasting.  A steady literature has emerged examining the relative performance of 
prediction markets and voting intention polls as predictors of election outcomes; 
something of a ‘horse-race’ of prediction markets compared to political polls.  
Studies have tended to focus on a number of issues regarding the relative performance of 
prediction markets and polls:  which is more efficient in aggregating and messaging 
information on the dynamics of voter behaviour and intentions; and, which is better at 
forecasting the outcome of the event (more often than not a given election).   While the 
weight of scholarly findings tends to show prediction markets are more efficient 
information collators and deliver better forecasts of election outcomes than are vote-
intention polls (Kou and Sobel, 2004; Leigh and Wolfers, 2006; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 
2006), they are not without their detractors (Erikson and Wlezien, 2008). 
One study (Leigh and Wolfers, 2006) of the relative performance of prediction markets 
and polls in forecasting the 2004 Australian federal election found political betting 
markets far and away out-performed vote intention surveys in forecasting the outcome of 
that election (both as to the outcome – a Liberal-National Party coalition win; and, the 
outcomes in three-quarters of marginal seats).  The authors were also strongly critical of 
the value of polls for election forecasting, arguing the margin of error reported by polling 
houses substantially overstated the precision of poll-based forecasts, and the relative 
volatility of the polls compared to the prediction markets over time suggests movements 
in the polls are more about noise than signal.    
However, other studies (Erikson and Wlezien 2008) challenge the evolving consensus 
favouring prediction markets over polls, pointing out analyses of their relative 
performances in forecasting election outcomes are not comparing like-with-like.   When 
the polling data is rebased (as projections of the election outcome as a whole) and thus 
made comparable to prediction markets, the former tend to outperform the latter in their 
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forecasting, and tend to be faster at absorbing new information which would likely 
impact the outcome of the election.    The superiority of poll-projections over prediction 
markets expands further when smoothing methods (such as moving averages) are applied 
to the two data series.  Indeed, they go so far to describe prediction markets as providing 
“…information that distorts more than informs regarding the forecast of the election winner beyond what 
we can tell from the polls” (Erikson and Wlezien, 2008: 212) 
However, an important question which has attracted only limited scholarly attention is 
whether prediction markets provide additional information above and beyond that which 
can be extracted from the polling data.  One study (Gurkaynak and Wolfers, 2005) 
comparing the results of the “Economic Derivatives” market to surveys of market 
economists of certain economic outcomes found the market-based predictions 
encompassed those of the survey-based forecasts, implying the former provided 
additional information  beyond that available in the latter.  However, another study 
focusing on economic indicators (Snowberg et al 2012) found a survey of business 
expectations did not encompass either initial unemployment claims or retail sales, 
suggesting the business confidence, and the labour force and retail series were 
complementary, and did not overlap in terms of the economic information provided.  In 
essence, each series had informational value for market participants.   
Another important issue in comparing the relative performance of prediction markets 
and polls in forecasting elections concerns the temporal horizons.   Interestingly, and far 
from trivial,  studies have found different relative performances at different times in the 
election campaign cycle, with betting markets performing more strongly than polls closer 
to the election date, but being “substantially poorer” (Leigh and Wolfers, 2006: 18) even 
three weeks before voters were required to cast their ballots.    Erikson and Wlezien 
(2008) find prediction markets only catch-up to projection polls in the final stages of the 
election campaign.  Similarly, other studies have found prediction markets do not always 
outperform polls: Berg et al 2003 put the ‘win rate’ for prediction markets at about 60 per 
cent for the elections studied using somewhat less interesting election eve data, and Berg 
et al 2007 put it at 68 per cent for ‘week before election day’ data.  Looked at another way 
polls outperformed prediction markets between 30 to 40 per cent of the time.  
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Another important issue assessing the relative performance of election prediction 
markets and vote-intention polling is the fulcrum issue of whether the comparisons are 
valid, and in particular whether we are ‘comparing like-with-like’.   In most election 
prediction markets, participants are taking a position (making a bet) on what they think 
will be the outcome of the election; the collective decision of other people (the electorate 
as a whole).   By contrast, vote-intention polls are generally expression of the political 
preferences of the individual respondent and their expected action on voting day (casting 
their ballot for Candidate A or Party B); they are expressing an opinion as to who they 
would like to win the election, not necessarily who they think will win the election.   
(While Newspoll does publish the results of polls asking respondents ‘who do they think 
will win the coming election’, these are only undertaken occasionally – just twice during 
the 2013 Australian federal election - and are not suitable for time series analysis.  
Nevertheless, voter expectations of the likely winner of the election broadly align with 
those of players in prediction markets – and the election outcome.) In short, prediction 
markets tend toward the macro-political (the behaviour of the electorate as a whole), 
while polls lean toward the micro-political (the behaviour of the individual voter).  
However, scholars (Berg, Nelson and Rietz, 2007: 4) have bridged this gap by arguing 
“… forecasting is a natural use of poll results and polls are the best alternative forecasts available.” 
Which Leads Which 
In contrast to the ample scholarly literature on the relative performance of prediction 
markets and vote intention polls as forecasting tools (and the not necessarily settled 
nature of the debate), seemingly scant attention has been paid to the questions of ‘which 
leads which’, and does ‘one add value to or replicate the information contained in the 
other’.  A priori it would not be unreasonable to expect published vote intention polls, 
which attract wide media reporting and discussion during the latter part of the electoral 
cycle and especially during more highly contested election campaigns, to lead prediction 
markets.  In short, prediction market participants use published polls (or forecasts 
thereof) to drive their position taking.  Scholarly studies appear to deliver mixed results 
on this question: Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann and Wright, 1992, finding prices in 
prediction markets do not follow polls, but rather tend to lead them; while Kou and 
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Sobel, 2004, find prediction markets do outperform polls alone, but only when the 
markets incorporate information from the polls. 
The data series used in this study come from two sources: the prediction data from 
Betfair, a commercial betting house, and are based on bets placed by market participants 
as to which of the two major parties – the Australian Labor Party, or the Liberal National 
Party (Coalition) will form government after the 2013 Federal Election; and, vote 
intention survey from Newspoll, a leading market research organisation, which polls 
eligible voters on their vote intention ‘if an election were held this Saturday?’.   The 
Betfair data were available on a daily basis commencing 1 January 2013 in betting odds 
form, which were converted by the author to probabilities of each of the major parties 
winning (summing to 100 per cent; that is, taking out the ‘bookies margin’).   
By comparison, the Newspoll data were generally available on a fortnightly basis 
commencing 12 January 2013, although became weekly during the election campaign 
period (that is, from 3 August up to 7 September 2013).  The Newspoll data used were 
the two-party preferred estimates of the vote support for the ALP and for the LNP (that 
is, after an distribution of preferences from the supporters of other parties and 
independents, which averaged a not-insubstantial 19 per cent of primary vote support 
over the election campaign period).  The final data set involved matching estimated 
probabilities from Betfair betting data to the same dates covered by Newspoll data 
(where Newspoll surveys were taken over three days, the middle date was used for 
referencing), producing a time series of 20 observations commencing 12 January and 
ending 7 September (election day) 2013. 
Before outlining and reporting the data analytics, it is worth reviewing the political 
context of the 2013 Australian Federal Election, most notably the ‘unusual’ political 
dynamics within the ALP Federal Government.  The 2013 political year commenced with 
what can only really be regarded as an outlier event – then Prime Minister Julia Gillard 
announcing at the end of January that the 2013 Federal election would be held on 14 
September.  The announcement effectively launched a more than 7 month election 
campaign, in contrast to the conventional Australian practice of the incumbent Prime 
Minister keeping the election date a closely guarded secret to gain tactical political 
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advantage over their opponents, followed by a formal election campaign of around 5 
weeks duration. 
The second notable feature of the 2013 political year was the instability within the 
leadership of the ALP Government, in particular the ongoing rivalry, and barely 
concealed hostility, between former ALP Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and his followers, 
and incumbent ALP Prime Minister Julia Gillard and her supporters within the 
parliamentary party (and within the ALP machine).  This was reflected in the ‘leadership 
challenge which never happened’ in March 2013 (when Rudd did not take up a chance to 
challenge Gillard when she gave him the opportunity to do so), and then ‘the leadership 
challenge which did happen’ in late June 2013 when Rudd responded to an opportunity 
to challenge Gillard, and defeated her in an acrimonious party room ballot.  As such, the 
ALP Government spent much of 2013 engaged in internecine warfare, which was 
inevitably reflected in the polls and the prediction markets, as can be seen in Graph 1 
following. 
 
 
Graph 1:  LNP Support in Polls and Prediction Markets 
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The two party preferred vote for the Liberal National Party (TPPLNP) remained fairly 
stable for much of the January to June period, if anything drifting upward slightly over 
the period, averaging around 55.4 per cent (figures for the ALP are just the converse – 
TPPALP = 100 – TPPLNP).  However, with the return of Kevin Rudd to the leadership 
of the ALP, and thus the Prime Ministership, the TPPLNP dropped from about 58 per 
cent just before his return to 51 per cent just after, before edging back up to around 54 
per cent in the final stages of the 2013 federal election.  By comparison, the prediction 
market saw the probability of an LNP win rise from around 74 per cent in mid-January to 
88 per cent just before Rudd’s return to the Prime Ministership, after which it dropped 
back to about 74 per cent before rising to 92 per cent the week before the election and 95 
per cent on election day (again, the figures for the ALP are just the converse – probability 
for the ALP = 100 – probability for the LNP; PRLNP).  A pairwise correlation shows the 
reasonably degree of coincidence between the two series (r = 0.412), which is on the edge 
of conventional statistical significance (r = 0.071). 
While the two series tend to move together, the underlying issue remains: do they 
essentially report the same information or does one contain additional information 
beyond that available in the other.   This leads to a null hypothesis of H0 = non-
additionality, that is the two series essentially contain the same information; and, an 
alternative hypothesis of HA = additionality, that is each of the series’ contain some 
element of information not available in the other.   To examine these hypotheses we will 
follow, with some extension, the approach taken by Alymer and Gill (2003) in a similar 
study into the additionality of business confidence surveys to official commercial and 
economic data releases.  In their three step schema: the first step involved examining the 
pair-wise correlations between the indicators of interest; the second step adding one of 
the variables to an auto-regression model of the other variable; and, the third step 
involved performing Granger causality tests between the variables of interest.   In this 
study, our modification is to broaden the first step to include cross-correlations (to 
identify lagged correlations), and concordance analysis (to see if the two series track each 
other across cycles). 
As reported earlier, a pairwise correlation of TPPLNP and PRLNP shows a reasonable 
degree of coincidence (r = 0.412), which is on the edge of conventional statistical 
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significance (r = 0.071), suggesting some degree of commonality in the information 
contained in the two series.  A cross-correlation (that is, measuring correlations across 
different lag-time periods) shows TPPLNP tends to lead PRLNP by one period (r = 
0.455; p = 0.05), rather than the other way around (r = 0.239; p = 0.324), suggesting 
information contained in the polls may feed into prediction markets, but not the other 
way around.    A concordance analysis (rc = 0.012; p = 0.104), however, would indicate 
to no practical (or statistically significant) agreement in the pattern of the simultaneous 
movement between the two series.   Taken together, these simple, first look tests would 
suggest at best a weak-to-modest association between the polls and the prediction 
markets. 
The next step involves estimating a set of simple auto-regressive models regressing: 
TPPLNP on its own lagged values; TPPLNP on its owned lagged values, and on present 
and lagged values of PRLNP; PRLNP on its own lagged values; and, PRLNP on its own 
lagged values, and on present and lagged values of TPPLNP.  If the present and lagged 
values of the non-dependent variable in each model do not achieve statistical significance 
at conventional levels, then this would add weight to the null (‘non-additionality’) 
hypothesis; if they are statistically significant, then this would favour the alternative 
(‘additionality’) hypothesis.  Table 1 following reports the results of these auto-regressive 
models, with the top panel reporting models where TPPLNP is the dependent variable, 
and the bottom panel where PRLNP is the dependent variable.  (EDS: TABLE 1 
ABOUT HERE) 
Looking first at Model 1 (TPPLNP regressed on its own lagged values) shows only 
TPPLNP lagged one period comes close to having any meaningful impact on TPPLNP 
(b = 0.44; p = 0.09), and overall the model has poor explanatory power (R Sq = 0.19; Adj 
R Sq = 0.08).   Adding present and lagged values of PRLNP (Model 2) shows neither of 
the newly added variables are statistically significant, with no real movement in the 
explanatory power of the model.  Turning to Model 3 (PRLNP regressed on its own 
lagged values), it would appear PRLNP lagged one period plays an important 
deterministic role (b = 0.978; p = 0.001), with the model having a reasonable degree of 
explanatory power (Adj R Sq = 0.523).  Adding current and one period lagged values of 
TPPLNP (Model 4) again shows neither of the new variables are statistically significant, 
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leading only to a reduction in model goodness of fit.   Both sets of results would appear 
to favour the null (‘non-additionality’) hypothesis – that is, neither adds anything to the 
explanatory power of the other. 
The third step is to apply Granger-causality tests to the TPPLNP and PRLNP variables 
to look for additionality.   The null hypothesis of Granger-causality is current and past 
values of one variable contain no additional information for estimating another variable 
beyond that found in lagged values of the latter variable.  In the current case, current and 
lagged values of TPPLNP/PRLNP contain no additional information in explaining 
PRLNP/TPPLNP than would be obtained from lagged values of PRLNP/TPPLNP.  
Rejection of this null hypothesis would signal additionality.  The results of Granger-
causality analysis can be found in Table 2. (ED: TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE).  These 
analysis considered four possible situations:  TPPLNP Granger-causes PRLNP; PRLNP 
Granger-Causes TPPLNP; there is instantaneous feedback between TPPLNP and 
PRLNP; and, the total correlation between TPPLP and PRLNP; across lags ranging from 
1 to 4 periods.  A review of Table 2 indicates we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
TPPLNP does not Granger-cause PRLNP, or PRLNP does not Granger-cause TPPLNP 
at any of the four lags considered, with the single exception of TPPLNP Granger-causing 
PRLNP at lag 4 (2 = 12.36; p = 0.02).  At best, it can be said PRLNP has no 
additionality upon TPPLNP, while TPPLNP has some delayed additionality upon 
PRLNP. 
Summary and Conclusion 
There is a growing volume of scholarly literature examining the performance of 
prediction (also known as betting) markets, both per se and relative to various forms of 
vote-intention polls, in forecasting election outcomes.   Prediction markets are seen to 
have a number of advantages over vote intention polls, such as they are better able to 
aggregate all relevant information, and have demonstrated superior forecasting ability.  
However, prediction markets are also seen to have a number of disadvantages, such as 
market-positions taken may reflect the underlying partisan biases (or gambling/ risk-
seeking inclinations) of players. 
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This study was initially motivated by a concern that forecasting competitions between 
prediction markets and vote intention polls may not be comparing like-with-like.   As 
observed, most election prediction markets involve participants taking a position on what 
they think will be the outcome of the election – that is, how the electorate as a whole will 
vote: will Party A or B win the plurality; a macro-political perspective.  By contrast, vote 
intention polls ask respondents of their vote preference, usually in the form of ‘who will 
you vote for on election day’ or some variant thereof; vote for Party A, or B or C or so 
on; a micro-political perspective.  The latter asks the individual about their personal 
preference; the former asks participants collectively their expectations of the election 
outcome.  
This study did not attempt to add directly to this literature, but sought to answer a 
different question.  That is, whether the two variables of interest (TPPLNP and PRLNP) 
contained any additional information not available in the other series: did information on 
PRLNP help explain TPPLNP; did information in TPPLNP help explain PRLNP.  The 
answer appears, by and large, to be in the negative – information in one does not help 
improve our knowledge of the other.  This situation may reflect one of two possibilities.  
The first is the two series are largely duplicates of each other, although their respective 
poor performances in the Granger-causality testing in particular would suggest this is not 
the case.  The second is the two series are largely independent of each other, which 
would be consistent with the outcomes of the auto-regressive modelling and the 
Granger-causality testing.  At the same time, intuition would likely support the 
interpretation of independence of the two series, given they essentially measure two 
different things – TPPLNP, the vote intention of individuals polled (ie micro-political); 
PRLNP, the expectation of political tragics as to the outcome of the election (ie macro-
political).   While time series’ of each metric can be usefully taken up for forecasting 
future values of itself, given their seemingly independent nature, comparisons of such 
forecasts are like comparing the dynamics and the outcomes of football matches with an 
archery competition. 
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Table 1:  Auto-regressive models for TPPLNP and PRLNP 
Dep Var tpplnp Model1 
   
tpplnp Model2 
  
          
 
b t p beta 
 
b t p beta 
Const 31.79 2.16 0.05 … 
 
28.09 1.88 0.08 … 
tpplnp(-1) 0.44 1.79 0.09 0.45 
 
0.33 1.28 0.22 0.33 
tpplnp(-2) -0.03 -0.11 0.91 -0.03 
 
-0.11 -0.42 0.68 -0.12 
Prlnp … … … … 
 
0.15 1.01 0.33 0.35 
prlnp(-1) … … … … 
 
0.01 0.08 0.94 0.03 
          R Sq 0.190 
    
0.300 
   Adj R Sq 0.082 
    
0.085 
   RMSE 2.25 
    
2.25 
   AIC 82.99 
    
84.36 
   SIC 85.66 
    
88.81 
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          Dep Var prlnp Model3 
   
prlnp Model4 
  
          
 
b t p beta 
 
b t p beta 
Const 28.95 1.91 0.08 … 
 
6.56 0.25 0.804 … 
prlnp(-1) 0.978 3.89 0.001 0.962 
 
0.871 3.16 0.007 0.856 
prlnp(-2) -0.313 -1.27 0.223 -0.314 
 
-0.286 -1.13 0.278 -0.288 
Tpplnp … … … … 
 
0.444 1.00 0.336 0.195 
tpplnp(-1) … … … … 
 
0.095 0.21 0.833 0.042 
          
          R Sq 0.579 
    
0.619 
   Adj R Sq 0.523 
    
0.502 
   RMSE 3.679 
    
3.76 
   AIC 100.70 
    
102.91 
   SIC 103.37 
    
107.36 
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Table 2: Granger-Causality between TPPLNP and PRLNP 
 
Granger 
Causality 
  
Granger 
Causality 
  
Instant 
Feedback 
  
Total  Total  
 
TPPLNP TPPLNP 
 
PRLNP PRLNP 
 
TPPLNP TPPLNP 
 
TPPLNP TPPLNP 
 
 >>  >> 
 
>> >> 
 
<<>> <<>> 
 
with with 
 
PRNLP PRNLP 
 
TPPLNP TPPLNP 
 
PRLNP PRLNP 
 
PRLNP PRLNP 
 
2 P 
 
2 p 
 
2 p 
 
2 p 
            lag 1 0.57 0.45 
 
0.16 0.69 
 
0.78 0.38 
 
1.51 0.68 
lag 2 0.45 0.80 
 
1.20 0.55 
 
1.15 0.28 
 
2.79 0.73 
lag 3 2.08 0.56 
 
2.28 0.52 
 
1.21 0.27 
 
5.57 0.59 
lag 4 12.36 0.02 
 
1.27 0.87 
 
0.12 0.72 
 
13.76 0.13 
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